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Anne Jackman* "Solutions in Sciences Outside of
the Law?" Rodriguez v. British
Columbia (A.G.)
Introduction
While we are forced, somewhat begrudgingly, to face the fact that there
are limitations to what medicine can achieve, we still seem to have an
undisturbed faith in what law can achieve. The limitations to what
litigation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' can
achieve was highlighted most recently in the case of Rodriguez v. British
Columbia (A.G.)2 where the Supreme Court of Canada, by a five to four
margin, upheld the constitutionality of the assisted suicide provisions of
the Criminal Code.3 The Court recognized that Ms. Rodriguez's rights
were violated but concluded that the infringement did not contravene the
principles of fundamental justice. Sue Rodriguez's right to autonomy and
bodily control was, in essence, pitted against a vague notion of the state's
interest in the "sanctity of life" and in the protection of the vulnerable.
Although it may be persuasively argued that the principles enshrined in
the Charter could conceivably lead to progressive social change,4 indi-
vidual rights litigation will rarely succeed if the Court, when performing
this balancing act, continually conceptualizes the state's interests as
superior to those of the individual. This case illustrates this recurring
dilemma within the Charter framework.
As Ms. Rodriguez and her supporters discovered, an individual's right
to die is subordinate to the state's right to protect life. As this case recently
demonstrated, the solution to the dilemma is one which continues to lie
"outside the law."5
* Legal Research Officer, Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia.
1. Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2. [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 [hereinafter Rodriguez, S.C.C.].
3. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter Code].
4. It has been argued, for example, that the Charter could be interpreted to require that social
programmes be applied equitably; see Parkdale Community Legal Services, "Homelessness
and the Right to Shelter" (1988) 4 J.L. & Social Pol'y 33.
5. On February 12, 1994, Sue Rodriguez died, apparently with the assistance of a physician;
M. Cernetig, "Police Suspect Rodriguez Suicide" The [Toronto] Globe andMail (14 February
1994) Al.
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Historical Background
At common law, suicide was considered an offence against both God and
the King. Until 1823, English law provided for the forfeiture of property
of a person who committed suicide and also that the body be placed at the
crossroads of two highways with a stake driven through it.6 In Canada, as
in Britain, the common law recognized that aiding suicide was also
criminal and this was enshrined in Canada's first Code7 in 1892. The
policy rationale behind these prohibitions appears to be that since one's
life was owned by God, one had no licence to take away that life or to
assist in the taking of the life of another.
Although suicide is no longer a criminal offence in Canada, assisted
suicide and aiding and abetting (counselling) a suicide remain offences
under the Code. The offence of attempted suicide was repealed in 19721
when Parliament acknowledged that suicide "has its roots and its solu-
tions in sciences outside of the law."9 The policy rationale here would
appear to be that it is impossible to prosecute a person for successful
suicide and inhumane to prosecute an unsuccessful attempt. Assisting
suicide, on the other hand, is still considered opprobrious in many
situations because suicide, though decriminalized, is still apparently not
acceptable to many people. Despite these Code prohibitions, cases of
assisted suicide are rarely prosecuted. 10 Sue Rodriguez pinned her hopes
on the Charter and sought to ensure that no criminal prosecution would
ensue following her assisted death.
Facts of the Case
Susan Rodriguez was a 42 year old woman from Victoria, British
Columbia who had amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), commonly
known as Lou Gehrig's disease. Ms. Rodriguez was terminally ill and, at
6. B.T. Gates, Victorian Suicide: Mad Crimes and Sad Histories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1988) at 3.
7. The Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 237.
8. By the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1972, S.C. 1972, c. 13, s. 16.
9. House of Commons Debates (27 April 1972) at 1699.
10. See, e.g., Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 28, Euthanasia, Aiding
Suicide and Cessation of Treatment (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1982) at 54.
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the time of argument in this case, had a life expectancy of between 2 and
14 months. Ms. Rodriguez wanted the opportunity to choose physician-
assisted suicide in the event that she was no longer able, in her view, to
enjoy life. She believed that by the time she reached that stage she would
be unable to terminate her life without the assistance of another person.
She sought a Court order which would allow a medical practitioner to set
up the "technological means by which she might, by her own hand, at the
time of her choosing, end her life."'" More specifically, Ms. Rodriguez
applied to the British Columbia Supreme Court for an order pursuant to
section 24(1) of the Charter that the provisions of the Code prohibiting
assisted suicide" be declared void.
She argued that section 241 of the Code violated her Charter right to
life, liberty and security of the person (s. 7); her right not to be subject to
cruel and unusual punishment (s. 12); and her right not to be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of physical disability (s. 15).13
Lower Court Decisions
Melvin J. of the Supreme Court of British Columbia 4 dismissed Ms.
Rodriguez's application. The Court concluded that s. 7 of the Charter
was not applicable since it only comes into play when a person is placed
in the justice system and, more specifically, is placed under the threat of
penal sanction or detention. According to this reasoning, Ms. Rodriguez
would never come in contact with the justice system regardless of her
11. Rodriguez, S.C.C., supra note 2 at 531.
12. Section 241 of the Code states:
Every one who
(a) counsels or procures a person to commit suicide, or
(b) aids or abets a person to commit suicide,
whether suicide ensues or not, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
13. The relevant sections of the Charter read:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.
12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment.
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
14. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.) (1992), 18 W.C.B. (2d) 279, [1993] B.C.W.L.D.
347 (B.C.S.C.).
"Solutions in Sciences Outside of the Law?"
actions and it would be the physician who assisted her who would be
subject to criminal sanctions. Using the same reasoning, the Court
dismissed s. 12 as inapplicable. Moreover, Melvin J. found that s. 15 did
not single out the physically disabled but, on the contrary, was designed
to protect rather than discriminate against them.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the lower Court deci-
sion 5 with a dissenting opinion written by MacEachern C.J. The majority
of the Court had two separate reasons for its conclusion. Hollinrake J.A.
found that, in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v.
Morgentaler,'6 Ms. Rodriguez was deprived of her s. 7 right to security
but that the deprivation did not contravene the principles of fundamental
justice. Hollinrake J.A. concluded that while there was af'me line between
physician-assisted suicide and palliative care, nonetheless the difference
was a "marked and significant one."17 He did not view the facts as
engaging either ss. 12 or 15 of the Charter. Proudfoot J.A. restricted-her
judgment to the appellant's section 7 rights and concluded that the
decision in Morgentaler was inapplicable to Ms. Rodriguez for two
reasons. First, Morgentaler dealt with the right to security of the person
only with respect to the preservation of health which is not what this
appellant was seeking. Second, she found that Morgentaler was a
criminal case and Ms. Rodriguez could never be charged criminally
under s. 241(b). Proudfoot J.A. did not address any infringement under
ss. 12 or 15. She concluded that the matter would be best left to Parliament
since the Court was "in no position to assess the consensus in Canada with
respect to assisted suicide."' 8 Neither majority decision necessitated a
progression to a section 1 analysis.
MacEachern C.J., dissenting, found a prima facie violation of the
appellant's s. 7 liberty and security interests in light of Morgentaler and
he determined that the infringements were contrary to the principles of
fundamental justice. He did not consider it necessary to consider ss. 12
and 15. He concluded that the section 7 violations were not saved by
section 1 of the Charter. Applying the second test of "proportionality"
15. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.) (1993), 76 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 1,
[1993] 3 W.W.R. 553 [hereinafter Rodriguez, C.A. cited to B.C.L.R.].
16. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler].
17. Supra note 15 at 171.
18. Supra note 15 at 186.
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fromR. v. Oakes,19 he concluded that the legislative means did not impair,
as little as possible, the right or freedom under consideration. He found
s. 241 to be unconstitutional with respect to its effect on Ms. Rodriguez.
He fashioned a remedy specifically tailored to her which guaranteed that
the physician assisting her to commit suicide would not be violating the
law of Canada if the following conditions were met:
(1) the Appellant must be deemed competent by her treating physician and
an independent psychiatrist not more than 24 hours before arrangements
for the assisted suicide and one of the physicians must be present with the
Appellant;
(2) the physicians must certify that: (i) the Appellant is terminally ill and
near death and that there is no hope of recovery; (ii) that she is, or but for
medication would be, suffering unbearable physical pain or severe psy-
chological stress; (iii) that they have informed her, and that she under-
stands, that she has a continuing right to change her mind; and (iv) when,
in their opinion, the Appellant would likely die (a) ifpaliative care is being
or would be administered to her, and (b) if palliative care should not be
administered to her;
(3) notice may be given to the Regional Coroner not less than three clear
days before any psychiatrist examines her and the Coroner must be present
for the examination;
(4) one of the physicians giving the certificate must re-examine her each
day to ensure she does not change her mind;
(5) no one may assist her after expiration of thirty-one days to ensure that
she has not changed her mind since she was examined by a psychiatrist;
and
(6) the act causing the death must be the unassisted act of the Appellant
herself, and not of anyone else.2"
Ms. Rodriguez appealed the decision of the majority of the Court of
Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
19. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103,65N.R. 87,50C.R. (3d) 1. Thesetests were reviewedinMorgentaler
by Dickson C.J.C. at 73-74:
In Oakes, at p. 139, the Court referred to three considerations which are typically useful
in assessing the proportionality of means to ends. First, the means chosen to achieve an
important objective should be rational, fair and not arbitrary. Second, the legislative
means should impair as little as possible the right or freedom under consideration.
Third, the effects of the limitation upon the relevant right or freedom should not be out
of proportion to the objective sought to be achieved.
20. Supra note 15 at 168-69.
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Supreme Court of Canada Judgments
The following constitutional questions were stated by order of the
Supreme Court of Canada on March 25, 1993:
1. Does s. 241(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada infringe or deny, in
whole or in part, the rights and freedoms guaranteed by ss. 7, 12 and
15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
2. If so, is it justified by s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and therefore not inconsistent with the Constitution Act,
1982?21
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the British Columbia Court of
Appeal decision by a five to four margin. The majority judgment was
written by Sopinka J. and concurred in by Justices La Forest, Gonthier,
lacobucci and Major. The majority found that, in light of theMorgentaler
decision, section 7 "encompass[ed] a notion of personal autonomy
involving, at the very least, control over one's bodily integrity free from
state interference and freedom from state-imposed psychological and
emotional stress." 2 As a result, the majority concluded that s. 241(b)
deprived the appellant of autonomy over her person and caused her
psychological and emotional stress which impinged upon her security of
the person.
In considering whether the infringements were in accordance with
principles of fundamental justice, the Court reviewed the common law
and legislative history of s. 241(b). The long-standing prohibition in
s. 241(b) was deemed to be for the protection of the vulnerable and
grounded in the state interest in protecting life. The Court considered the
state's interest in protecting life to be part of the fundamental concept of
the sanctity of life. The Court also recognized a valid distinction between
passive and active intervention in the dying process and stated that
Canadian law accepts passive intervention, such as the withdrawal of life
support, but does not accept active intervention, such as the injection of
a lethal drug. SopinkaJ. was of the view that the active/passive distinction
was one which could be "persuasively defended."' 3 The Court concluded
that, in light of concerns about abuse and the difficulty in creating
adequate safeguards, s. 241(b) was not arbitrary or unfair and therefore
that it did not infringe s. 7 of the Charter.
21. Supra note 2 at 543.
22. Supra note 2 at 587-88.
23. Supra note 2 at 608.
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In analyzing the alleged violation of section 12 of the Charter, the
Court considered whether or not Ms. Rodriguez was subject to "treat-
ment" and concluded that a mere prohibition by the state of certain actions
did not constitute "treatment." Since the appellant could not in any way
be subject to the justice system, s. 12 was deemed inapplicable.
With respect to the alleged violation of section 15, the Court sum-
marily dismissed this portion of the argument in one page of its thirty-five
page decision. Rather than addressing whether or not there had been a
breach of s. 15, as alleged by Ms. Rodriguez and many of the interve-
nors,24 Sopinka J. stated: "Since I am of the opinion that any infringe-
mentis clearly savedunder s. 1 of the Charter, Iprefernotto decide these
issues in this case."5
The Court accepted that there was "probably" a violation of Ms.
Rodriguez's s. 15 right not to be discriminated against on the basis of
physical disability, but that in any event it was justifiable under section
1 of the Charter. In assessing section 1, the Court reviewed the three
considerations in assessing proportionality of means to ends as specified
in Oakes and concluded that: (1) s. 241(b) has a pressing and substantial
legislative objective and the means chosen to achieve it were rational and
fair; (2) in light of support for this type of legislation the government had
a reasonable basis for concluding that it had complied with the requisite
minimum impairment test; and (3) the balance between the restriction and
the government objective was also met since there were no procedural
safeguards which could have been relied upon to achieve the legislation's
purpose. As a result, the s. 15 infringement was justified under s. 1 and
the appeal was dismissed.
There were three minority decisions delivered by Lamer C.J.C.,
McLachlin J. and Cory J. McLachlin J. 26 addressed both the s. 15 and s. 7
arguments. In relation to s. 15 she stated that the case was not a section
15 case about discrimination and that treating it so may deflect equality
jurisprudence from the true focus of s. 15, "to remedy orprevent discrimi-
nation against groups subject to stereotyping, historical disadvantage and
political and social prejudice in Canadian society."27 However, in relation
to s. 7 she argued that, in light of Morgentaler, Ms. Rodriguez's right to
24. See, e.g., factum ofthe British Columbia Coalition of People with Disabilities at4-12 and
factum of the Right to Die Society of Canada at 3.
25. Supra note 2 at 613 [emphasis added].
26. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concurring.
27. Supra note 2 at 616 [citing R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 at 992, per Lamer C.J.C.].
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security of the person had been arbitrarily violated. She proposed that the
effect of the distinction which makes suicide lawful and assisted suicide
unlawful is to deny to some people the choice of ending their lives solely
because they are physically unable to do so and that this prevents them
from exercising autonomy over their bodies. McLachlin J. drew an
analogy to the Morgentaler decision and concluded that since Parliament
cannot justify the arbitrary legislative scheme found in s. 241 (b), the law
is notsavedunders. 1 of the Charter. The solution proposed by McLachlin
J. was that the Code be supplemented to require a Court order permitting
assistance of suicide only where a judge is satisfied that the consent is
freely given.
Lamer C.J.C. based his dissenting judgment solely on the infringement
under s. 15 and did not address either ss. 7 or 12. He concluded that
s. 241(b) treats physically disabled people differently from able-bodied
people. The treatment is also unequal because it prevents people who are
physically unable to end their lives unassisted from choosing assisted
suicide when suicide is an option available to others. Lamer C.J.C. found
that while the legislative objective of s. 241(b) was defensible, it was
over-inclusive because those who are not vulnerable or who do not want
the state's protection are affected. This over-inclusiveness was deemed
to be unjustifiable under s. 1 of the Charter.
Lamer C.J.C. also suggested a cure for the situation by declaring the
section of no force or effect but he suspended the declaration for one year
to allow Parliament to amend the legislation, during which time a superior
Court would have power to grant a personal remedy. The remedy,
according to Lamer C.J.C., would have to be considered in light of the
individual's context, and the guidelines as outlined by McEachern C.J. in
the court below were approved.
Although Cory J. gave a separate set of reasons, he was essentially in
agreement with the other two dissenting judgments except he found that
both sections 7 and 15 were infringed. Cory J. also agreed with the
conditions as outlined by the McEachern C.J.
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Comment on Majority Judgment
There are a number of aspects of this case which are particularly
troubling as not the least of which is the personal tragedy of Sue Rodriguez
and the choices she was forced to make in light of the decision. It is also
a difficult decision because of the manner in which the whole issue was
framed and the terminology which was used to describe what Ms.
Rodriguez was seeking. The labels used to describe the phenomenon
inevitably shape the form of the debate itself. Whether we refer to an act
as "suicide," "euthanasia" or "mercy killing," each term carries the
weight of values and assumptions which are inherent in the use of the
label itself. The word "suicide" is not one which is generally thought of
in a particularly positive light and our laws and legal decisions go to great
lengths to distinguish suicide from other "acceptable activities." For
example, the decision to refuse a blood transfusion is conceptualized as
the exercise of an individual's right to autonomy and self-determina-
tion.29 Why is the refusal of antibiotics by a terminally ill person suffering
28. One oftheissues whichI findperplexingis the question: Why have most ofthepublicized
Court cases involving "right to die" issues involved women? In Canada we have seen in recent
years the cases of Nancy B., Mrs. Malette, Mary Astaforoff and, most recently, Sue Rodriguez.
In the United States, the cases which come to mind include Nancy Cruzan, Karen Ann Quinlan,
Janet Adkins, Patricia Diane Trumbell and the many women assisted by Dr. Kervorkian. One
author attempts to explain the phenomenon as follows:
As the sex that traditionally has been considered less authoritative and less capable of
achieving autonomy, and has had greaterdifficulty in asserting itself, women symbolize
the extent to which the movement towards letting people die on their own terms rather
than be compelled to live on others' terms is a movement of the disadvantaged against
the powerful. (B.M. Dickens, "From Letting Die to Inducing Death-The Legal
Transition" (1991) 8 Transplantation/Implantation Today 13 at 20)
This, I believe, is too simplistic and it presumes that seeking Court approval is a challenge to
authority, when it could more reasonably be considered as an acceptance of an authoritarian,
hierarchical and male-dominated Court system. Perhaps women have been socialized to seek
approval orassistance through legal channels ratherthanby taking the law into theirown hands.
Itmay be thatwomen are more conscious of the issues surrounding control of theirbodies since
there is so much legal regulation of a woman's reproductive capacity. When Sue Rodriguez
asked: "Who owns my body?" she may have been expressing this desire for control.
Possibly, as well, women are accustomed to caregiving and are less comfortable with accepting
the care of others when ill. Or perhaps women do not want the memories of family and friends
to be those from the final stages of a debilitating disease? I do not know the answer to this
question but I believe it is more than a mere coincidence that the majority of cases appear to
involve women.
29. InMalette v.SShulman (1990),72 0.R. (2d) 417 (C.A.), thecourt decided, based upon Mrs.
Malette's right to bodily integrity and self-determination, that the blood transfusion given to
her against her previously expressed wishes (via a "no blood products" card) amounted to a
battery. Damages of $20,000 were upheld.
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from pneumonia not considered suicide? The right to refuse treatment is
one of the most fundamental rights in our society3" even though it may
inevitably result in death, but it is not considered "suicide."
The fundamental imperative, then, in examining any debate is to
question the language and framing of the problem. Some of the alterna-
tives to the legalization of assisted suicide which have evolved in the post-
Rodriguez debate go to great lengths to avoid using the word "suicide."
One such suggestion is that "simply ceasing to eat is a dignified way to
die."'" This solution is never described as "suicide," but surely this is what
is contemplated since the person is taking her or his life voluntarily.
Arguably, then, the administration of analgesics to alleviate pain and
discomfort to people who are "simply ceasing to eat" should also be
considered "assisting suicide."
The use of the word "euthanasia" also carries certain negative conno-
tations. Without this pejorative label, the acts and decisions described
would likely be viewed by most people as ones of benevolence and
compassion. In Mi'kmaq communities in Nova Scotia, for example,
when a person lay dying it was common practice to prepare for death with
dignity and if death did not occur after a period of time cold water was
poured on the person to hasten death as an act of kindness.32 In the eyes
of the Roman Catholic Church, however, such practices were seen as
"euthanasia" or even "murder. 33
Even more unfortunate is the fact that language choices create dichoto-
mies which inevitably lead to dualistic thinking, such the distinction
between "active" and "passive" euthanasia. The Supreme Court of
Canada's reliance upon the distinction between active/passive euthanasia
as one which is justifiable under law describes "passive" euthanasia as the
withdrawal or withholding of treatment that allows a person to die, while
"active" euthanasia requires a positive act, such as providing a lethal
dosage of narcotics or a lethal injection, to hasten death. This either/or
dichotomy, however, ignores the relationships and situations where the
distinction does not appear to fit. "Passive" euthanasia, for example, may
include turning off a respirator, withdrawing treatment, but it is, at the
30. Perhaps with the exception of forced obstetrical intervention for pregnant women; see,
e.g., . Grant, "Forced Obstetrical Intervention: A Charter Analysis" (1989) 39 U.T.L.J. 217
who argues that forced intervention amounts to a violation of a woman's right to bodily
integrity and constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.
31. G.L. Frederick, "An Easy Alternative to Assisted Suicide" The [Toronto] GlobeandMail
(23 September 1993) A29.
32. "Mi'kmaq Spirituality" inMi'lanaq Past andPresent: A Resource Guide (Halifax: Nova
Scotia Department of Education, 1993) at 10.
33. Ibid. at 10.
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same time, an "act." Similarly, providing pain-killing medication which
may hasten death has not been considered active euthanasia. 4
The distinction has caused a great deal of confusion, especially among
religiously affiliated hospitals across Canada. After the Rodriguez, C.A.
decision, for example, the Archbishop of Vancouver sought to clarify the
matter and condemned both "active and passive" euthanasia. The
Archbishop's directive on health care stated that withdrawal of intrave-
nous food and water is acceptable "if it causes physical risks and
hardships, psychological burdens or economic and other burdens to
caregivers."35 This is confusing since the withdrawal of artificial nutrition
and hydration has always been considered to fall in the category of
"passive" euthanasia.
The distinction between active and passive euthanasia appears fre-
quently throughout the medical and legal literature on the subject, but it
has recently been subject to serious criticism due to its creation of false
categories which are not clearly delineated.3 6 As a result, the term
"euthanasia "is now applied generically, and "most experts now reject the
use of the term 'passive euthanasia' .13 Similarly, others argue that since
the underlying motive (i.e., compassion) and the end sought (i.e., the
termination of suffering) are the same in both cases, there is also no moral
distinction to be made between the two.
38
One of the most persuasive criticisms of the active/passive distinction
has been made by Professor Leslie Bender:
The law seems to use similarjustifications for its active/passive or killing/
letting die distinctions. These rationales are legitimate only if we agree
with three underlying assumptions: 1) laws and ethical principles must be
34. It is widely accepted that if there is no other way to assuage pain, a doctor would be
morally justified in administering a pain-killing drug to a patient whose death was imminent,
even if she or he believed that the drug might have the incidental effect of hastening death. See
P.G.D. Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine: Studies in Medical Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1988) at 131 [citing Pope Pius XII, Allocution to the Italian Society for the Science of
Anaesthetics, 24 February 1957, (1957) 49 Acta Apostolicae Sedis 129-47 and Archbishop D.
Coggan, "On Dying and Dying Well: Moral and Spiritual Aspects" (1977) 70 Proc. Roy. Soc'y
Med. 75 at 130].
35. S.Mertl, "VancouverArchbishop ClarifiesStand on Euthanasia"The [Halifax] Chronicle-
Herald, The Mail-Star (12 May 1993) A14.
36. See, e.g., J. Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia" in R.M. Baird& S.E. Rosenbaum,
eds. Euthanasia: The Moral Issues (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1989) 45.
37. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Decisions Near the End of Life (American
Medical Ass'n, Report: D (A-91), 1991) at 3.
38. J. Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia" in J.E. Thomas, ed., Medical Ethics and
Human Life: Doctor, Patient and Family in the New Technology (Toronto: Samuel Stevens,
1983) 291 at 295.
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designed for the "bad actors"; 2) each line must be firly set to prevent a
precipitous decline down the proverbial slippery slope; and 3) truly bad
actors are in fact deterred by laws. I am unpersuaded by each. Although
there are, and always will be, a number of bad actors, most of us do not fall
in that category. If we write our laws or set our standards to curtail the
actions and improper motivations of a small contingent of people on the
margin, we may disempower the majority of us in the center from acting
on noble and virtuous impulses. Physician aid-in-dying exemplifies this
critique.39
Sopinka J. seems particularly concerned about bad actors and refers to the
"macabre" trend seen in the United States with Dr. Kervorkian's suicide
machine.40 Most people, including proponents of assisted suicide, how-
ever, are also disturbed by this trend and many argue that allowing
assisted suicide with strict procedural safeguards will prevent Kervorkian-
type initiatives. Additionally, Sopinka J. refers to the French suicide
guide Suicide, mode d'emploi: histoire, technique, actualit941 which is
similar to the best-seller Final Exit by Derek Humphreys of the Hemlock
Society. While these types of suicide manuals were disturbing to the
majority, a recent study in New York suggests that the number of suicides
in the city did not increase after publication of the book. There was merely
an increase in the method of suicide outlined in the manual.
42
What, then, is the majority's rationale for maintaining this distinction
between active and passive euthanasia? It appears to be a familiar one: the
"slippery slope" argument. The typical "slippery slope" argument is that
the long term consequences of social policy X will lead to the socially
undesirable result Y. In this case, the decriminalization of assisted suicide
(a so-called form of voluntary "active" euthanasia) will lead to involun-
tary active euthanasia of people who are disabled, vulnerable or those
which society considers not worth keeping alive.43 As has been articu-
39. L. Bender, "A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Active
Euthanasia" (1992) 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 519 at 532.
40. Dr. Jack Kervorkian, a retired Michigan pathologist, developed a crude but effective
suicide machine which enabled people to take their own lives. Kervorkian has assisted in
twenty deaths since 1990, some of which involved individuals who were not terminally ill; see
J. Persels, "Forcing the Issue of Physician-Assisted Suicide: Impact of the Kervorkian Case on
the Euthanasia Debate" (1993) 14 J. Legal Med. 93.
41. C. Guillon & Y. Le Bonniec (Paris, France: A. Moreau, 1982).
42. P.M. Marzuk et aL, "Increase in Suicide by Asphyxiation in New York City after the
Publication of FinalExit" (1993) 329:20 New Eng. J. Med. 1508 analyzed 1335 suicides one
year before and one year after the release of Final Exit. The number of people using the plastic
bag method jumped from 8 to 33 but there was no overall increase in the city's suicide rate.
43. Y. Kamisar, "Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed 'Mercy Killing' Legisla-
tion" (1958) 42 Minn. L. Rev. 969 at 976 puts it this way: "[The danger [is] that legal
machinery initially designed to kill those who are a nuisance to themselves may someday
engulf those who are a nuisance to others."
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lated elsewhere, however, the "slippery slope" is often invoked in order
to express objection to the original socialpolicy itself.44 This is sometimes
the case with objections to abortion which are based on a slippery slope
that ends in infanticide. This may simply be another way of expressing the
objection that abortion is an instance of killing an innocent human being.
To put it more critically, slippery slope arguments are often used as scare
tactics to prevent the implementation of a particular policy in the first
place.
The decision of the majority also appears to be premised upon a "lack
of consensus" on the issue of assisted suicide:
... I am unable to discern anything approaching unanimity with respect to
the issue before us. Regardless of one's personal views as to whether the
distinctions drawn between withdrawal of treatment and palliative care, on
the one hand, and assisted suicide on the other are practically compelling,
the fact remains that these distinctions are maintained and can be persua-
sively defended. To the extent that there is a consensus, it is that human life
must be respected and we must be careful not to undermine the institutions
that protect it.
45
Sopinka J. does not use Canadian statistics but he places reliance on the
recent state referenda in Washington and New York 6 where the voters in
both states rejected "aid-in-dying" legislation by votes of 54 percent to 46
percent.47 What is not referred to in the Court's decision, other than
through reference to the lack of procedural safeguards, is the concern of
the citizens surveyed during exit polls that the initiatives could lead to
abuse by physicians motivated by profit alone. Under a Canadian medical
system this shouldbeless of a concern and it is not likely that a"specialty"
field would develop for doctors interested only in profiting from assisted
suicide or "active" euthanasia. While voters narrowly rejected these
initiatives, in the three months following the Washington vote, four
states-Michigan,48 New Hampshire,49 Maine, 0 andIowa5 -introduced
44. B. Williams, "Which Slopes are Slippery?" in M. Lockwood, ed., Moral Dilemmas in
Modem Medicine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 126 at 127.
45. Rodriguez, S.C.C., supra note 2 at 607-08; Sopinka J.'s comments about "a lack of
consensus" from society opposing the state's right to regulate assisted suicide have been
severely criticized in the popular media, see S. Fine, "Rodriguez Lost to Public Opinion" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (2 October, 1993) A5.
46. Washington Initiative 119 (1-119) and New York Proposition 161 (P-161).
47. See J. Gross, "Voters Turn Down Mercy Killing Idea" The New York Times (7 November
1991) B 16 and "Assisted Suicide Stays in the News" Choice in Dying News (New York, N.Y.:
The National Council for the Right to Die, 1992) at 2.
48. H.B. 5415, Mich. 86th Legis., 2d Sess. (1992).
49. H.B. 1275, N.H. Legis., 1992 Sess. (1992).
50. Legis. Doc. 2257, Me. 115th Legis., 2d Sess. (1992).
51. S. File 2066, Iowa 74th Legis., 2d Sess. (1992).
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legislation to legalize either assisted suicide or physician aid-in-dying for
the terminally ill. 2 The Court also does not discuss the results of a 1991
U.S. nationwide opinion poll by The Boston Globe and the Harvard
School of Public Health which revealed that almost two-thirds of Ameri-
cans favoured both physician assisted suicide and active euthanasia for
terminally ill patients requesting either.-"
It is questionable, in fact, whether the Court is correct in concluding
that most Canadians do not agree with the use of assisted suicide.
According to the Canadian Medical Association, 60 percent of Canadian
physicians who responded to a survey favoured some form of euthana-
sia. 4 Similarly, a survey of Alberta physicians showed that 51 percent
favoured decriminalization of voluntary euthanasia which is requested
by the patient. Ironically, however, the same survey showed that 55
percent rejected "physician assisted-suicide" which was seen as a "moral
copout" because the doctor leaves while active euthanasia is more a
medical act which a physician is better capable of controlling. 5 A
national Angus Reid poll commissioned by the Right to Die Society of
Canada showed that 34 percent of voters would react favourably to a
candidate who expressed support for doctor-assisted suicide for termi-
nally ill persons, 17 percent would react negatively and 47 percent said
it would make no difference to them.56
The fact that euthanasia appears to be happening "in one form or
another on a daily basis"57 in Canada is not as reassuring to proponents of
euthanasia as one might expect. Why should the law turn a blind eye to
the activities of the medical profession? If it is occurring daily and Crown
Attorneys are either unaware of it or are using prosecutorial discretion in
not laying charges, this approach should be reflected in the current law so
that medical professionals do not risk criminal prosecution and/or profes-
sional sanctions. By the same token, there should also be procedural
safeguards in place to attempt to control potential abuses by physicians. 8
52. C.K. Smith, "What about Legalized Assisted Suicide?" (1993) 8 Issues L. & Med. 503
at 503.
53. R.A. Knox, "Poll: Americans Favour Mercy Killing" The Boston Globe (3 November
1991) 1.
54. "Euthanasia 'Daily' Eventin Canada, DoctorSays" The [Halifax]DailyNews (25 August
1993) 10; see also "Sue Rodriguez's Last Request" The [Toronto] Globe andMail (2 October
1993) D6.
55. See J. Morris, "Most Alberta Doctors Oppose Legalizing Assisted Suicides" The
[Halifax] Chronicle-Herald (30 September 1993) A18.
56. M. Smyth, "Poll Shows Leadership Sought on Euthanasia" The [Halifax] Chronicle-
Herald The Mail-Star (19 October 1993) A7.
57. "Euthanasia Daily Event in Canada," supra note 54.
58. The safeguards outlined by McEachem C.J. supra note 20 provide a good example.
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Even if it could be definitively established that there is a lack of
consensus, is this sufficient to justify the violation of Sue Rodriguez's
rights under the Charter? McLachlin J. said "no" to this question:
Nor do I agree with the fact that medically assisted suicide has not been
widely accepted elsewhere bars Sue Rodriguez's claim. Since the advent
of the Charter, this Court has been called upon to decide many issues
which formerly lay fallow. If a law offends the Charter, this Court has no
choice but to so declare.
59
Sopinka J., however, seems to support the principle that judges must not
readily impose or amend laws which the legislators have seen fit to ignore
or delay. This notion6" belies the fact that the Courts have pushed
government into arenas which it avoids because of a perceived lack of
consensus or, more significantly, because of the potentially divisive
nature of the subject within the political parties themselves.6 In addition
to remedying legislative omissions, Courts have also removed legislative
obstacles to, for example, equality rights under the Charter. This ap-
proach was displayed in Morgentaler where the Supreme Court of
Canada struck down the abortion provisions contained in the Code
because the effect of the provisions was to deny or delay therapeutic
abortions and thereby endanger the security interests of some women.
This violated a woman's section 7 security of the person rights and did not
comport with the principles of fundamental justice. In the view of
McLachlin J. the decision in Morgentaler was dispositive of the issues on
appeal in this case as well.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the assisted suicide
provisions of the Code deprived Sue Rodriguez of autonomy over her
person and caused her psychological and emotional stress. This infringed
59. Rodriguez, S.C.C., supra note 2 at 617.
60. "[N]ot to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence" as
articulated by B.N. Cardozo, The Nature ofthe Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1949), quoted in Re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010
at 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Burger J., concurring in dissent), cert. denied 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
61. The new federal Justice Minister's original response to the call for a Parliamentary re-
examination of assisted suicide is notparticularly reassuring in suggesting that the Senate study
the issue; see B. Cox, "Senate Should Re-Examine Euthanasia-Rock," The [Halifax]
Chronicle-Herald (24 December 1993) A14. Since the death of Sue Rodriguez, however, the
Minister has agreed that the issue should be "reconsidered by Parliament and that a potential
change to the law should be put to a free vote of MPs"; see H. Winsor & M. Cernetig,
"Rodriguez Death Puts Focus on Ottawa" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (15 February 1994)
Al.
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upon her s. 7 interests but was found to be in accordance with fundamen-
tal justice as reflected in the fundamental concept of "sanctity of life." The
s. 15 violation, which "probably" occurred, was deemed justifiable in
light of the state's s. 1 interests. The case demonstrates that the hurdle for
individuals who are litigating rights violations under the Charter is not
the proof of the violation itself but the difficult proportionality test under
s. 1.
In spite of its balancing of interests and discussion about consensus,
the majority appears to simply have disagreed, fundamentally, with what
Ms. Rodriguez was requesting. The following comment of Sopinka J.
seems particularly revealing:
The appellant suggests that for the terminally ill, the choice is one of time
and manner of death rather than death itself since the latter is inevitable.
I disagree. Rather it is one of choosing death instead of allowing natural
forces to run their course .... Even when death appears imminent, seeking
to control the manner and timing of one's death constitutes a conscious
choice of death over life.
62
In the final analysis, though, in choosing to end her life with assistance
Sue Rodriguez did take control over her right to autonomy and bodily
integrity. In so doing, she may have helped move the government towards
what she spent the last years of her life fighting for: changes in the law to
allow assisted suicide for the terminally ill. For this she will long be
remembered.
62. Supra note 2 at 585-86.
